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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this proceeding are: John A. Fericks and C. Kurt Hoffman, 
plaintiffs/appellants; and Joe Goodman and Pentad Properties, Inc., defendants/appellees. 
In addition to the parties to this appeal, the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust and Carlos R. Soffe, 
Vaughn C. Soffe and Shirla S. Holt, as Trustees of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, were 
named as defendants. Finally, the plaintiffs listed a John Doe Buyer as a defendant. This 
party was never identified or served. The Lucy Ann Soffe Trust and its trustees are not 
parties to this appeal. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, concluding, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs could prove no exceptions to the 
statute of frauds applied to warrant enforcement of the oral modification of REPC? 
(Issue preserved in the Record at 64-83; 165-193; 194-208; 271-77; 291-95) 
Standard of Review: On appeal, the appellate court reviews the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled to summary 
judgment presents a question of law, the appellate court grants no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See Higgins. 855 P.2d at 235; 
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
II A. Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues 
of material fact which would excuse the plaintiffs from the requirement that any 
modifications to the Real Estate Purchase Contract be in writing signed by the parties? 
(Issue preserved in Record at 64-83; 165-193; 194-208; 271-77; 291-95) 
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Standard of Review: No deference is given to a trial court's legal 
conclusions which are reviewed for correctness. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Springville 
Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P2d 332. 
IIB. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 56(f) 
extension to allow plaintiffs to conduct basic discovery for the purpose of determining if 
Appellees Pentad and Goodman (and the Soffe Defendants through Pentad/Goodman as 
their agents) were engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, or other artifice to deprive the 
plaintiffs of rights and benefits under their own Real Estate Purchase Contract with the 
Soffe Defendants? (Issue preserved in Record at 165-193; 194-208; 264-65; 271-77; 
291-95) 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for 
additional discovery time is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard based upon 
whether the discovery sought by the moving party would be legally relevant to the 
resolution of issues on summary judgment. CampbelL Maack & Sessions, v. Debry, 2001 
UT App 397, f6, 38 P.3d 984; American Towers Owners Assn. v. CCI Mech.. Inc.. 930 
P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); Holmes v. American States Ins. Co.. 2000 UT App 85, 1 P.3d 
552. 
III. After ruling the statute of frauds barred any oral modification of the 
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REPC, did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims of fraud, breach of duty and 
intentional interference with contract, concluding the statute of frauds precluded these 
causes of action as well? (Issue preserved in Record dt. 291-95; 320-21; 322-25) 
Standard of Review: No deference is given to a trial court's legal 
conclusions which are reviewed for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P2d 332. 
IV. Did the trial court err in determining that Goodman and Pentad were 
entitled to attorney fees and costs under the REPC as the agents of the seller? (Issue 
preserved in Record at 373-74; 375-86; 421-22; 423-24; 430-34) 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & 
Assocs.. 910 P.2d. 1252 (Utah App. 1996). 
V-VI. Was the award of attorney fees to Goodman and Pentad supported by 
sufficient evidence, properly allocated to covered claims, reasonable and supported by 
findings of fact after independent review by the trial court? (Issue preserved in Record at 
373-74; 375-86; 421-22; 423-24; 430-34) 
Standard of Review: Where attorney fee are awarded on summary 
judgment, the undisputed material facts must establish as a matter of law that the 
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prevailing party is entitled to the award, the amount of the award is reasonable and the 
award is properly attributed to covered claims. See Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 
1998); Taylor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Court App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Resolution of the case necessarily involves application of the statute of 
frauds, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, which provides: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing." 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an Order Granting Summary Judgment which 
purportedly resolved all claims against all defendants, and from the Findings/Judgment 
awarding attorney fees and costs to Pentad and Goodman. Plaintiffs are not appealing the 
Summary Judgment on their claims directly against defendants Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, and 
the Trust's Trustees, Carlos R. Soffe, Vaughn C. Soffe, and Shirla S. Holt (the "Soffe 
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Defendants"). Nor are plaintiffs appealing the Trial Court's award of attorney fees and 
costs to the Soffe Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") for purchase 
of undeveloped commercial property in Salt Lake County, Utah. Plaintiffs (C. Kurt 
Hoffman ("Hoffman") and John Fericks ("Fericks")) were the buyers for a purchase price 
of $313,000. The Soffe defendants were the sellers. Defendant/Appellee Joe Goodman 
("Goodman") was the sellers' real estate agent. Defendant/Appellee Pentad Properties, 
Inc. ("Pentad") was the real estate brokerage which employed Goodman. (R. at 54-55, 
77-82) A $5,000 earnest money payment was deposited by plaintiffs with Pentad on 
February 1, 2002 when the parties signed the REPC. An additional $10,000 non-
refundable earnest money deposit was due on April 6, 2002. (R. at 55, 77-82). 
In a telephone call between Hoffman and Goodman on March 26, 2002, 
plaintiffs arranged a 30-day extension of the April 6, 2002 deadline with Goodman, as 
agent for the sellers. Goodman committed to create a written memorial of the extension. 
(R. at 195-97) During this same conversation, Goodman discussed a possible tenant to 
lease space in the building plaintiffs proposed to build on the subject property. (R. at 196) 
On April 5, 2002, Hoffman again called Goodman regarding the extension. Goodman 
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apologized for not confirming the extension and vowed to care of it that day. (R. at 196) 
The next day, April 6, 2002, plaintiffs, in reliance on Goodman's representations, did not 
tender the second earnest money payment-although they were willing and able to make 
the payment at that time. (R. at 199, 273-74) 
On April 8, 2002, the very next business day after the April 6, 2002 
deadline, Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, notified plaintiffs that the 
deadline for the additional earnest money had expired and sellers considered the REPC 
void. (R. at 197,207, 271-74) At this point, however, the sellers, through Goodman and 
Pentad, did not indicate another buyer had been lined up to buy the property. (R. at 207) 
After receiving the April 8 letter voiding the deal, Fericks inquired about the extension. 
During these conversations with Goodman and Carlos Soffe, the seller, plaintiffs learned 
that sellers, with the assistance of Goodman and Pentad, had been negotiating with new 
buyers who were offering more money and a quicker closing date. (R. at 273) More 
importantly, the statements of Goodman and Pentad, and other related circumstances, 
suggested that the negotiations with the later buyer were occurring contemporaneous with 
the requests for an extension of the April 6 deadline. (R, at 273) 
Based on the curious timing of the new buyer and the apparent 
misrepresentations of Goodman and Pentad, plaintiffs filed their Complaint on May 6, 
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2002, and tendered the additional earnest money by deposit with the Court Clerk pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1. (R. at 1-17) The Complaint sought the following relief 
against the indicated defendants: 
i. Against Pentad and Goodman: breach of real estate 
professional statutory and common law standards of care with regards to rights of third 
parties (R. at 4-5); 
ii. Against Pentad and Goodman: intentional interference with 
contractual and economic interests (R. at 5); 
iii. Against Pentad and Goodman: fraud and/or misrepresentation 
regarding the 30-day extension on the deadline for the additional earnest money deposit 
(R. at 5); 
iv. Against Soffe Defendants: specific performance under the 
REPC (R. at 5); 
v. Against Soffe Defendants: breach of contract (R. at 5); 
vi. Against a John Doe Buyer: for declaratory judgment of no 
interest in the property as competing buyer (R. at 5). 
Plaintiffs sought relief variously against the defendants including: damages, specific 
performance, punitive and exemplary damages, and statutory damages under Utah Code 
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Ann. §61-2-17(4). (R. at 5-6) 
In very short order, defendants filed motions to dismiss (R. at 27-53); the 
plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (R. at 54-60); defendants answered the amended 
complaint (R. at 114-26; 130-42; 143-46); defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment (R. at 84-113,127-29); plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on the legal 
merits and requested a Rule 56(f) extension for additional time to conduct discovery (R. 
at 165-93); Plaintiffs issued requests for production of documents to Goodman and 
Pentad and noticed the deposition of Pentad's principle broker, Greg Shields, for August 
29, 2002. (R. at 264-65) A hearing was held by the trial court on the Motions for 
Summary Judgment on August 19, 2002. (R, at 266-67, 284) Based upon the language in 
the REPC which required all changes to be in writing signed by parties, the trial court 
announced summary judgment in favor of all defendants. (R. at 284) 
Objections followed with regard to the form and scope of the proposed 
Order submitted to the trial court which covered not only the claims brought directly 
under the REPC, but also the common law and statutory claims, particularly against 
Pentad and Goodman. (R. at 291-95) In spite of these objections, on September 30, 2002 
the trial court entered the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment. It disposed of 
all claims against all defendants. (R. at 320-21, 322-25) 
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Applications for attorney fees and costs wrere subsequently granted over the 
objections of plaintiffs that argued (1) defendants Pentad and Goodman were not parties 
to the REPC and had no statutory or contractual basis upon which to be awarded legal 
expenses; (2) the claims asserted against Pentad and Goodman were not contractual in 
nature and did not arise out of the REPC; and (3) the requested fees were not reasonable 
or supported by proper evidence and findings. (R. at 326-39,340-61, 362-64,365-69, 
373-74,375-86,396-417,421-22,423-24,428-29,430-34,435-37) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in three primary respects: (1) 
granting summary judgment, (2) disposing of all claims against Goodman and Pentad 
based on the statute of frauds, and (3) awarding Goodman and Pentad attorney fees. 
Specifically, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that the oral agreement 
extending the deadline is enforceable as a matter of law. Additionally, plaintiffs 
submitted sworn affidavits which indicate that material issues of fact exist, precluding 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs timely submitted discovery requests to Goodman and 
Pentad requesting information to support their claims. Plaintiffs requested the trial court 
grant them time to conduct this basic discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). This request was 
denied, and plaintiffs had no opportunity to conduct basic discovery. 
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On the issues of the award of attorney fees to Goodman and Pentad, 
plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in finding that Goodman and Pentad were entitled 
to attorney fees under the REPC. Goodman and Pentad are not parties or even third-party 
beneficiaries of the REPC. In addition to having no contractual or statutory basis for 
receiving fees, the award of attorney fees was not properly supported nor reasonable 
given the length and complexity of this litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Where the Parties Have an Enforceable Contract that Satisfies the Statute of 
Frauds, the Statute of Frauds Does Not Preclude a Subsequent Oral 
Modification of a Non-Material Term of the Contract. 
The trial court erred in concluding that under the Statute of Frauds an oral 
agreement modifying when a second earnest money deposit was due was unenforceable 
as a matter of law. Defendants argued and the trial court ruled1 that because the contract 
was for real property the statute of frauds required any oral modification of the contract to 
be in writing to be enforceable. Although the statute of frauds may apply to any alteration 
or modification of a written contract, "a recognized and accepted exception to the statute 
1
 The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in granting defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing on defendants' motion, the court received no 
evidence and the arguments by counsel followed their briefs. Accordingly, plaintiffs will refer to 
defendants' arguments below because these arguments are the legal bases for the court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
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of frauds provides, '"[i]f a party has changed his position by performing an oral 
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the party to found a claim upon the 
original agreement^] . . . the modified agreement should be held valid."'" Fisher v. 
Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (applying exception to statute of 
frauds to contract for purchase of real estate) (quoting White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1301 
(Utah 1983); Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 201, 48 P.2d 489, 492 
(1935), aff d on reh'g, 88 Utah 213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1936)). This rule of law applies to all 
contracts, "even if the agreement being modified unambiguously indicates that any 
modifications must be in writing." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,113 n.4,40 
P.3d 1119 (citing Prince v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co., Inc., 610 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 
1980)). Utah case law recognizes that parties frequently orally modify contracts that must 
be in writing, and, in certain circumstances, these oral modifications are enforceable 
notwithstanding statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary. See Allen v. Kingdon, 
723 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that oral modification of real estate 
contract may be enforceable where it would be inequitable based on parties' performance 
under contract and oral modification); Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176-77; Holt v. Katsanevas, 
854 P.2d 575, 579-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (oral modification of real estate contract 
could be enforced notwithstanding statute of frauds and trial court should not have 
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granted summary judgment on the issue). 
In Fisher, the parties entered into a contract for the sale of real property. 
According to the buyers of the property, the seller orally agreed to postpone annual 
escrow payments of $10,000. See Fisher. 907 P.2d at 1174-76. After the seller died, the 
seller's heirs argued that any oral agreement to postpone the escrow payments was 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed 
and determined that the oral modification was enforceable because the buyers had 
changed their position and partially performed on the contract in reliance on the oral 
agreement. See id. at 1176-77. 
Like the buyers in Fisher, plaintiffs in this case changed their position and 
continued to perform under the contract. Specifically, the plaintiffs had already tendered 
one earnest money payment on the contract. Additionally, plaintiffs were continuing to 
perform on the contract by taking the following actions: (1) completing their due 
diligence as set forth in the REPC; (2) working with the City of South Jordan for approval 
of development plans for the property, i.e. feasibility; (3) assembling investor money to 
fund the project; and (4) arranging surveys and architectural planning for the site. (R. at 
195-98) Due to delays with the City of South Jordan, plaintiffs sought an extension for 
the payment of the second earnest money payment. Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of 
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the sellers, agreed to this extension. Importantly, the requested extension was not due to 
plaintiffs' inability to tender the required earnest money, concerns about feasibility of the 
plans or doubts about buying the land. (R. at 199, 271-74) 
In reliance on the oral agreement, plaintiffs did not tender the earnest 
money payment by the deadline set forth in the REPC and continued with their feasibility 
study. As noted, plaintiffs were willing and able to tender the second earnest money 
deposit by the required deadline. (R. at 199, 274). As further corroboration of this fact, 
plaintiffs tendered the money to court in conjunction with filing the complaint on May 6, 
2002. (R. at 4). A few days after the deadline, Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the 
sellers, sent a letter indicating the contract was void due to the failure to tender the second 
earnest money agreement. Shortly after this letter, plaintiffs learned that the sellers, using 
Goodman and Pentad, had already arranged for a different buyer for the land at a higher 
price. Accordingly, plaintiffs lost their opportunity to purchase the land and wasted their 
time and effort in conducting a feasibility study. 
Defendants argued the rule of law in R.T. Nielsen and Prince was not 
applicable because those cases did not involve a contract which needed to satisfy the 
statute of frauds. Instead, defendants argued Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah 1996); 
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Wardlev Corp. Better 
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Homes & Gardens v. Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) controlled the issue 
and required any oral modification to be in writing to be enforceable. Indeed, in the 
circumstances presented in these cases, enforcement of the purported oral modification is 
not warranted. For example, in Stangl, the issue was whether promissory estoppel 
precluded the defense of statute of frauds. See Stangl, 948 P.2d at 360. First, the Court 
of Appeals discussed prior Utah case law on the issue. See id. at 360-65. Specifically, 
the Court of Appeals found that Utah Supreme Court had "recognized the limited 
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds . . . . " Id. at 362 
(citing McKinnon v. The Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Dav Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974)). The Stangl and McKinnon opinions 
recognized that '"a mere promise to execute a written contract and a subsequent refusal to 
do so is insufficient to create an estoppel.. . . '" Id. at 363 (quoting McKinnon, 529 P.2d 
at 436-37). Because the parties in Stangl had never entered into a written lease 
agreement, the court concluded the statute of frauds was available as a defense. 
In contrast to Stangl where the issue was whether an oral agreement to enter 
into a contract was enforceable, the buyer and seller in this case had entered into written 
agreement which fully satisfied the statute of frauds. The analysis in Stangl has no 
relevance to whether or not an oral agreement to modify a non-material term of a valid 
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written contract is enforceable. Stangl addresses the statute of frauds in the context of 
negotiations prior to the parties actually entering into a contract. 
On the other hand, in both Burgess and Mills the parties had entered into 
enforceable written agreements. See Burgess. 810 P.2d at 476-77; Mills. 929 P.2d at 361-
62. In Burgess, the parties had entered into a written listing agreement for a six-month 
period. See Burgess. 810 P.2d at 476-77. Under the agreement, if the realtor found a 
buyer for the property, the seller would owe the realtor a commission. The day before the 
expiration of the listing agreement the realtor claimed the seller orally agreed to extend 
the listing agreement for an additional six-months. The Court of Appeals adopted the 
analysis of an Ohio court which recognized the oral modification was a "new contract" 
and modified an "essential term" of the contract. See id. at 478. Furthermore, the Utah 
Supreme Court had previously recognized the "unyielding duty upon real estate agents 
and brokers to obtain written listing agreements or face the risk of nonpayment." Id at 
477. Based on that important policy concern with respect to real estate commission 
contracts and the fact that the oral modification went to a material term which essentially 
created a new contract, the court applied the statute of frauds and found the oral 
agreement unenforceable. See id. at 478. 
Unlike Burgess, the parties did not orally modify an essential term of the 
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contract or create a new contract. In this case, the plaintiffs secured an oral agreement 
from Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, for an extension of time for tendering 
a second earnest money payment. This extension did not affect the closing date or final 
payment price for the land. None of the essential terms of the contract (i.e. the legal 
description of the subject property, the parties to the contract, the sale price, and date and 
means of final payment) was modified or extended. It is well-established that an oral 
modification to a non-essential term of a contract required to be in writing is enforceable 
notwithstanding the statute of frauds' requirements. See, e.g.. Allen, 723 P.2d at 396 
(oral agreement that modifies material term of contract must be in writing); Holt, 854 
P.2d at 579 (same); James H. Moore & Associates Realty, Inc. v. Arrowhead At Vail, 892 
P.2d 367, 372 (Col. Ct. App. Div. Ill 1995) (contract subject to statute of frauds may be 
orally modified "so long as the oral modification does not relate to a material condition of 
that contract"); Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 764 (10th Cir. 1977) (oral modification to 
non-essential term of contract is enforceable notwithstanding statute of frauds). Stated 
differently, an oral modification of a contract subject to the statute of frauds is allowed so 
long as the modification does not affect a material term thus causing the underlying 
contract to not satisfy the statute of frauds. 
The date upon which the additional earnest money deposit of $10,000 was 
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due is not a material part of the REPC. The material elements of a contract for the sale of 
real property include the identity of the parties, the identity of the property, the agreed 
closing and the agreed price. See, e.g., English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 
616 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (setting out essential parts of lease contract as property identity, 
term, rental amount and period); Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell. 1999 UT App 55, f 12, 
976 P.2d 1218 (noting essential terms of option contract include price and property 
description). Importantly, this modification did not affect the stated closing date in the 
REPC of February 15, 2003. In this case, the REPC, with the oral modification, was still 
enforceable and still satisfied the statute of frauds. 
Finally, defendants cited Mills for further support that courts will not 
enforce oral agreements. In Mills, the lessee of a condominium sought to exercise ail 
option to purchase the condominium. The lessor argued that the lessee's attempt to 
exercise the option orally was insufficient and that any oral agreement to extend the 
deadline to exercise the option was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See Mills, 
929 P.2d at 361-62. Most of the opinion in Mills addresses whether the lessee's exercise 
of the option was sufficient. See id. at 362-364. In addressing whether the oral 
agreement to extend the deadline was enforceable, the court stated the recognized rule 
that the statute of frauds requires a written agreement to extend an option deadline, in the 
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absence of an estoppel. See id. at 364. Accordingly, Mills does not alter or contradict the 
analysis set forth in Fisher. Allen. Holt or Stangl. Because the lessee failed to argue 
estoppel, the trial court correctly ruled that any oral agreement to extend the option 
deadline was unenforceable, and the appellate court could not consider whether any 
equitable considerations warranted an exception to the statute of frauds. See id. at 364. 
In this case, plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was improper for 
several reasons: (1) the parties orally agreed to modify the deadline for the second earnest 
money agreement, (2) the oral agreement was enforceable because it modified a non-
material term of the REPC; and (3) the defendants relied to their detriment on the oral 
modification by continuing to pursue their development plans for the property, continuing 
their dialogue with the City of South Jordan and not tendering the second earnest money 
payment by the deadline; and (4) enforcement of the contract without the oral 
modification would be inequitable based on plaintiffs change in position in reliance on 
the oral agreement. C£ Madsen v. Anderson. 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) (law abhors 
forfeiture of property and forfeiture is disfavored where notice to a buyer is either 
uncertain as to required future performance or misleads buyer into thinking forfeiture will 
not be enforced). 
As the above authorities provide, defendants were not entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law on the issue of the statute of frauds. Utah law provides for clear 
exceptions to the statute of frauds. First, an oral modification may be enforced when it 
does not affect a material term of the contract. In this case, the REPC was still a valid 
and enforceable contract with the oral modification. Second, an oral modification may be 
enforced when a party has changed its position in reliance on the oral agreement and 
partially performed on the contract. Here, plaintiffs had tendered money and were in the 
process of conducting a feasibility study. Plaintiffs, in reliance on the agreement, did not 
tender the second required payment by the deadline, and based on defendants' subsequent 
acts, plaintiffs lost their opportunity to purchase the property. Accordingly, it would be 
inequitable to enforce the REPC without the oral modification of the second earnest 
money deadline. At the very least, as the above cases indicate and as more fully set forth 
in the second argument, the issue of the oral modification, plaintiffs' reliance and change 
in position, and the application of the statute of frauds present factual issues which would 
preclude a grant of summary judgment. 
II. Given the Disputed Issues of Material Fact and the Lack of Opportunity to 
Conduct Discovery, the Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment Was 
Error and Denial of Plaintiff s Rule 56(f) Request Was an Abuse of 
Discrection. 
The application of the statute of frauds to this case presents factual issues 
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precluding summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued factual issues existed, promptly served 
discovery requests on Goodman and Pentad and requested time to conduct discovery 
under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied plaintiffs' 
requests and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, depriving plaintiffs of 
the opportunity to investigate their claims. 
A. Resolution of Plaintiffs' Contract Claims Necessarily Required 
Determination of Material Issues of Fact. 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because disputed issues 
of material facts existed. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The opinion in Holt v. 
Katsanevas. 854 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) is instructive on this issue. In Holt, the 
parties entered into contract for the sale of real property. The parties subsequently orally 
modified the contract. See id. at 579. Although neither party denied entering into the oral 
agreement, the terms of the agreement were disputed. The seller argued that oral 
agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See id. In reversing the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment to the seller, the Court of Appeals stated: "Therefore, 
if we conclude that the parties genuinely dispute the terms of their oral agreement and the 
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dispute is material because plaintiffs could enforce the version of oral agreement they 
describe, we must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs." 
Id. at 580. Furthermore, the court stated: "Plaintiffs could establish materiality by 
proving that its version of the disputed oral agreement could be found enforceable as a 
matter of law." Id. The court went on to reverse the grant of summary judgment to allow 
plaintiffs to fully present their claims because plaintiffs' allegations indicated disputed 
issues of material fact. See id. at 580-81. 
Although Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, vigorously dispute 
entering into any oral agreements with plaintiffs to extend the deadline, the fact that the 
parties in Holt did not dispute an oral agreement was made does not distinguish that case 
from the present for two reasons: (1) on appeal, this court must view the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party which means this court on 
appeal must accept that the parties did enter into an oral modification; and (2) the 
defendant in Holt, like defendants in this case, argued any oral modification was 
unenforceable as a matter of law. The court in Holt faced the same issue as presented 
here: Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment finding the statute of 
frauds rendered an oral modification of a contract for real property unenforceable. 
Under Holt, if plaintiffs can prove a set of facts which would support an 
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enforceable oral modification, summary judgment is not appropriate. In this case, 
plaintiffs have submitted sworn affidavits alleging an oral modification of a contract 
which excuses them from tendering the second earnest money payment by the deadline 
set forth in the contract. (R. at 194-208; 271-77) Additionally, plaintiffs attached records 
and correspondence which tends to corroborate their sworn testimony and the allegations 
that an oral agreement to extend the deadline was made. (R. at 194-208; 271-77) 
Plaintiffs have not alleged any additional modifications of any material terms of the 
contract, such as the parties, the property, the price or the closing date. Finally, plaintiffs 
have alleged facts to show a change in their position and continued performance based on 
their reliance on the oral agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs' performed on the contract by 
taking the following steps: (1) completing their due diligence as set forth in the REPC; (2) 
working with the City of South Jordan for approval of development plans for the 
property; (3) assembling investor money to fund the project; and (4) arranging surveys 
and architectural planning for the site. (R. at 195-98) These allegations are sufficient to 
show continued and partial performance under the contract and to create a disputed issue 
of material fact. Furthermore, if proven at trial, these facts are sufficient to make the oral 
agreement enforceable. Plaintiffs' affidavits indicate disputed issues of material fact, and 
accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
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B. Because Plaintiffs' Claims Were Viable as a Matter of Law and 
Plaintiffs Served Discovery Requests in a Timely Manner, Denial 
of the Rule 56(f) Request to Conduct Discovery Was An Abuse of 
Discretion. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it granted summary judgment less 
than three and one half months after the Complaint was filed and before defendants 
discovery responses to plaintiffs' written discovery requests were due. Utah law provides 
that "summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since 
information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to 
defeat the motion." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Further, under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 
judgment is inappropriate where the moving party has exclusive control of the facts. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). "Courts generally construe this rule liberally in favor of the 
nonmoving party to allow for adequate discovery that may create genuine issues of fact 
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 
P.2d 556, (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (affirming denial of Rule 56(f) request on the basis that 
discovery would not have aided plaintiff in proving negligence claim). The Court of 
Appeals has articulated two factors that a trial court should examine in ruling on a Rule 
56(f) request: "(I) whether the party submitting the motion is merely attempting to gain 
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'additional discovery time to uncover purely speculative facts after substantial discovery 
has already been conducted,' and (2) 'whether the other party has appropriately responded 
to discovery requests.'" Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 2001 UT App 397,1J9, 38 
P.3d 984 (citations omitted). 
This action was filed on May 6, 2002 with an Amended Complaint filed on 
June 6, 2002. (R. at 1-17; 54-60) On July 22, 2002, plaintiff, without an attorney 
planning meeting or scheduling order in place, served discovery on defendants and 
noticed a deposition for August 29, 2002. (R. at 264-65) The trial court granted 
defendants motion for summary judgment from the bench on August 19, 2002 before 
defendants answered plaintiffs' discovery requests. (R. at 284) Defendants moved the 
court for a protective order to avoid answering plaintiffs' discovery on August 23, 2002. 
(R. at 285-90) The court granted defendants motion for a protective order and entered the 
final order disposing of all claims on September 27, 2002. (R. at 320-25) 
Presumably, the trial court denied plaintiffs' discovery requests because it 
determined plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. See, e.g.. Holmes v. American 
States Ins. Co., 2000 UT 85,1ffl26-27, 1 P.3d 552 (rule 56(f) request properly denied 
where plaintiff had no claim as a matter of law). As the argument in section one 
indicates, however, plaintiffs in this case had a viable claim that the oral agreement was 
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enforceable under exceptions to the statute of frauds. Additionally, plaintiffs submitted 
sworn affidavits which disputed material issues of fact. Plaintiffs' affidavits set forth 
allegations which supported their claims in the Amended Complaint. 
In this case, the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) request was an 
abuse of discretion as it deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to investigate and develop 
their claims. Plaintiffs complied with the substance of Rule 56(f) by indicating what 
evidence was sought in its pending discovery and the method for obtaining this 
evidence-pending discovery requests. See Campbell. Maack & Sessions, 2001 UT App 
397 at ^9. (R. at 178-79) Plaintiffs submitted written discovery and noticed up 
depositions. Plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity to depose the principal parties of 
this litigation to determine and identify the true nature and scope of the agreements 
reached after the REPC was executed and to determine the facts relevant to the second 
transaction between the Soffe Trust and John Doe Buyer. Since plaintiffs dealt primarily 
with Joe Goodman and Pentad and because no depositions or formal discovery occurred 
prior to the court's grant of summary judgment, plaintiffs could not submit detailed 
affidavits regarding the dealings between the seller and its agent. In fact, plaintiffs prior 
to the court's grant of summary judgment did not even know the identity or the terms of 
the contract between seller and John Doe Buyer. Plaintiffs should have been allowed to 
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conduct at least some initial discovery to prove the allegations as set forth in its 
Complaint. 
III. The Statute of Frauds Provides No Basis for Dismissing With Prejudice 
Plaintiffs' Claims of Fraud, Breach of Duty and Intentional Interference 
With Contract. 
After determining the statute of frauds made the oral modification 
unenforceable, the trial court erred in disposing of the remainder of plaintiffs' claims 
which did not implicate the statute of frauds or require enforcement of the oral 
modification to succeed. The trial court ruled the oral modification was unenforceable as 
a matter of law, and therefore, the statute of frauds barred all plaintiffs' claims because 
each depended in some way on the oral modification being enforceable. The trial court's 
legal conclusion that each of plaintiffs' claims was barred as a matter of law is a legal 
conclusion reviewed for correctness. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
CitvofSpringville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P2d 332. 
On this issue, the trial court adopted the argument set for in defendants' 
response to plaintiffs' objection to the proposed order granting summary judgment. (R. at 
320-21). In arguing the court should dispose of all plaintiffs' claims, defendants relied on 
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In StangL the Court of 
Appeals stated: "'Fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the failure to perform a 
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promise or contract which is unenforceable under the statute of frauds, for the promissor 
has not, in a legal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right, both in law and 
equity, to refuse to perform." Id. at 362 (quoting McKinnon v. The Corporation of the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974)). 
In both Stangl and McKinnon. the parties had not entered into any contracts. See id. at 
357-360; McKinnon. 529 P.2d at 435-36. Accordingly, the court correctly noted an oral 
promise to enter into a contract was unenforceable and any claims related to the oral 
promise were similarly deficient. 
In this case, however, an enforceable written contract, the REPC, existed. 
Subsequent to entering into the REPC with sellers, plaintiffs attempted to get an 
extension of time to tender the second earnest money payment. The sellers of the 
property had a right to receive the payment by the deadline. Based on the representations 
of Goodman and Pentad, on behalf of the sellers, plaintiffs believed that the sellers were 
agreeable to payment of the money after the deadline set forth in the contract. On this 
point, the Stangl court stated: "'An exception is recognized when a misrepresentation as 
to the future operates as an abandonment of an existing right of the party making the 
representation, i.e., the promise as to the future conduct must constitute a manifestation 
that the promissor will abandon an existing right which he possesses.'" Id. at 362 
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(quoting McKinnon. 529 P.2d at 436). 
This statement contemplates the exact circumstances of this case. The 
sellers had a right under the REPC to receive the second earnest money payment by the 
date set forth in the contract. Plaintiffs requested an extension to tender this payment. 
Based on the representations made to them, plaintiffs believed sellers were agreeable to 
the extension and acted in reliance on the representation. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, 
sellers and their real estate agent were working with other buyers who would pay more 
for the property. After the deadline for the second earnest money payment past, plaintiffs 
were informed that the sellers considered the REPC void for lack of payment of the 
second earnest money payment. If proven, these facts would not implicate the statute of 
frauds as they are based on the parties' course of dealing and the rights and obligations set 
forth in the REPC. Furthermore, these facts would support claims of breach of duty, 
fraud and interference with contract. 
IV. Because Goodman and Pentad Are Not Parties to the REPC, No Basis 
Exists for Awarding Them Attorney Fees. 
Utah law requires a contractual or statutory basis for recovery of attorney 
fees by a successful litigant. See Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993); 
Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (owner/lessor who is not a 
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party to construction contract between lessee and contractor can not be liable for attorney 
fees based on contract). "'Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness.'" Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 91 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Neither of Goodman nor Pentad are parties to the REPC. They are 
identified only in Paragraph 5 as agents for the seller, and in fact, Pentad's effort to 
represent the plaintiffs as Buyer under the REPC was explicitly deleted. (R. at 10) 
The REPC does provide: "in any action arising out of this Contract, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." In this 
sentence, the word "party" has the ordinary meaning associated with a party to the 
contract, as used consistently throughout the REPC. There is no justification for reading 
the term beyond the four corners of the document to include parties to any litigation 
involving the REPC. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has addressed this issue in 
interpreting an attorney fee provision in a real estate sales contract. See Wardley Corp. v. 
Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Welsh, the real estate broker, Wardley, 
sued the seller of real property for its commission. After prevailing on its request for its 
commission, the broker requested its attorney fees as third-party beneficiary of the 
purchase agreement between the seller and buyer. See id. at 91-92. The language in 
Welsh is identical to the language in the REPC, which awards attorney fees to the 
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prevailing party in any action arising out of the contract. See id. at 91. 
In analyzing the attorney fee provision, the Court of Appeals recognized 
that "'attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable only in accordance with the 
explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by contract.5" Id at 92 
(citation omitted). The court focused on the word party in the attorney fee provision. In 
construing this term, the court stated: "We have examined the contract as a whole and 
located the words 'party5 and 'parties' in a variety of provisions. In these contract 
provisions, those words are used in a way that can logically refer only to the direct parties 
to the contract-Welsh, the seller, and Peterson, the buyer-not to the potentially much 
larger group of parties to the litigation growing out of the contract." Id at 92. The court 
went on to state: "Harmonizing all the terms of this contract, we conclude the words 
'party' and 'parties' refer only to the signatories to the contract-Welsh [seller] and 
Peterson [buyer]. Only Welsh [seller] and Peterson [buyer] therefore may enforce the 
attorney fees provision against each other." Id2 
At the trial court, Goodman and Pentad attempted to distinguish Welsh by 
arguing it had no application because it was an action by the broker against the seller 
2
 Indeed, the sellers, who are not a party to this appeal, applied for and were properly 
awarded their fees by the trial court. Plaintiffs did not object to the basis for awarding fees or the 
amount of fees claimed by the sellers. 
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rather than an action by the buyer against the seller and its broker. As the analysis in 
Welsh indicates, such a distinction is not relevant when interpreting the plain language of 
the REPC. Although Goodman and Pentad are referenced as the buyer's agent in the 
contract, this reference does not make them parties to the contract. Specifically, 
Goodman and Pentad had no rights or obligations under the contract. They simply were 
the seller's agent. Their obligation was to facilitate the transaction as directed by their 
principle, the sellers. In return, Goodman and Pentad were entitled to receive a 
commission on the transaction under a commission agreement entered into between seller 
and Goodman and Pentad. The mere fact that Goodman and Pentad were named as 
defendants in this litigation does not entitle them to an award of attorney fees. 
Additionally, the fact that Goodman and Pentad had an agency relationship 
with a party to a contract does not entitle Goodman and Pentad to fees under the contract. 
Appellants are not aware of any Utah case law awarding fees to a non-party to a contract 
on the basis of an agency relationship to a party to the contract. That Goodman and 
Pentad could bind the sellers by virtue of the agency relationship is similarly unavailing. 
This agency relationship is common in real estate transactions and is not a basis to make 
the real estate agent a party to the purchase contract. The real estate agent's rights and 
obligations flow from the listing agreement entered into with the seller. This agreement 
31 
provides the amount of the commission which compensates the real estate agent for 
his/her efforts. The listing agreement is not a part of the purchase agreement. Courts 
examining the issue of whether a real estate agent/broker are parties to a purchase 
contract have found that only the buyer and seller are parties to the contract. See, e.g., 
Welsh, 962 P.2d at 91-92 (only signatories of purchase contract are parties entitled to fees 
under contract); Harris v. Richard N. Groves Realty, Inc.. 315 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 4th Dis. 1975) (real estate purchase contract contemplates formal party to contract 
and real estate broker is not a party); cS, Harwig v. Downey, 56 P.3d 1220, 1221-22 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (tenants who were not a party to land purchase contract could not 
recover fees under contract as intended beneficiaries). Because Goodman and Pentad are 
not parties to the REPC, the trial court erred in awarding them attorney fees. 
V. If Goodman and Pentad Are Parties to the REPC, The Claims Against 
Goodman and Pentad Were Not Covered by the REPC. 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Goodman and Pentad the 
entire amount of the requested fees. "'An award of attorney fees must be based on 
evidence and supported by findings of fact.'" Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 
1998). A party seeking the award of attorney fees has the burden of producing evidence 
to support the requested award. See id. at 55. This evidence must include an allocation 
between: (1) time and effort spent on causes of action for which attorney fees are allowed 
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by contract or statute; and (2) time and effort spent on causes of action for which there is 
no allowance for attorney fees. Id.; see also, R.T. Neilsen Co. v. Cook, 2002 Utah 11,40 
P.3d 1119; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). "The trial 
court, in turn, must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
requested fees in light of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. 
Goodman and Pentad have made no attempt to allocate the efforts of their 
counsel between claims under the REPC and claims outside the REPC. This omission is 
most likely because no contractual claims were asserted against Goodman and Pentad, 
and therefore there were no fees to allocate to covered claims. The plaintiffs' Complaint, 
and their First Amended Complaint, contain six causes of action. The first three, directed 
specifically at Goodman and Pentad, are outside the REPC. They are: (1) for breach of 
statutory and common law standards of care for real estate agents with regard to the rights 
and interests of third parties; (2) for intentional interference with the contractual and 
economic interests of plaintiffs vis-a-vis the selling party, the Soffe Trust; and (3) for 
fraud or misrepresentation with regard to verbal communications. The Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Causes of action are not directed at Goodman and Pentad at all. They are: (4) for 
specific performance against the Soffe Trust requiring it to sell the property to plaintiffs 
pursuant to the REPC; (5) in the alternative, for damages against the Soffe Trust for 
breach of the REPC; and (6) against the John Doe Buyer for declaratory determination 
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that his competing and subsequent purchase agreement was subordinate to the plaintiffs' 
REPC with the Soffe Trust. 
The causes of action asserted against Goodman and Pentad are not 
contractual claims that "arise out o f the REPC. Thus, no contractual or statutory basis 
exists for an award of attorney fees on independent claims which rely upon the 
enforceability of an oral contract or the reliability of oral representations. Even if 
Goodman and Pentad can be construed as "parties" under the REPC, because they have 
failed to allocate their fees among covered and uncovered causes of action, there is no 
evidentiary basis upon which an award of attorney fees can be made. 
VI. Goodman and Pentad's Requested Fees Are Not Reasonable In Light of the 
Length and Complexity of the Litigation. 
When determining the reasonableness of fees and expenses, a trial court 
should answer four questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorneys billing rate consistent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
34 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). 
The principal issue in the present case is the second Dixie/Bracken 
factor-how much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately defend 
Pentad and Goodman. This factor is an accumulation of a number of analytical questions, 
including: the difficulty of the litigation; the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case; the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar services; the amount in 
controversy; the result obtained; and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. See id. at 989. 
As a preliminary matter, however, Mr. Shields' rate is not customary for 
attorneys in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Shields started this matter with a rate of $220 
which increased to $240, on the high side of local rates, and then finally increased to $265 
when he switched firms in the middle of this litigation. (R. at 340-43) No evidence was 
submitted to verify that these rates are customary. A comparison of the rate charged by 
the seller's counsel, which is admittedly low, highlights the problem with Mr. Shields' 
rate. (Compare R. at 340-43 ($220-$265) with R. at 365-66 ($125)). The standard under 
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Utah law is not the rate an attorney can charge in the area, but the rate customarily 
charged in the area. Mr. Shields may have clients that he can bill at $265/hour, but that 
rate is not customary in Utah for routine real property disputes. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the total amount of requested fees by 
Goodman and Pentad is simply breathtaking for approximately 4-5 months of non-
complex litigation involving no discovery. The initial Complaint in this matter was filed 
on May 6, 2002. (R. at 1-17). The court granted summary judgment on August 19, 2002. 
(R. at 284) The court's ruling was entered to include all causes of action on September 
27, 2002. (R. at 320-21). During that time, no discovery occurred. There was no 
document productions or voluntary disclosures, and no attorney planning conference. 
The first pleading filed by the Pentad defendants was their May 31, 2002 Motion To 
Dismiss. That pleading is based upon interviews of Pentad's owner, Greg Shields 
(brother of Pentad's attorney, Jeff Shields), and Pentad's co-defendant and agent, Joe 
Goodman, both of whom were available to Pentad's counsel at the touch of a telephone. 
The pleading relied upon the review of a six-page standard REPC document. The 
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pleading included some generic research on the legal standard under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The legal authority is cited in the standard annotation of 
the Utah Code. The pleading does contain some good research on contract interpretation 
and the Statute Of Frauds, but the research is neither extensive nor unduly sophisticated. 
Goodman and Pentad next filed an Answer to plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint and an accompanying Motion For Summary Judgment, both on June 21, 2002. 
The Answer relied largely on facts fleshed out in the Motion To Dismiss. The 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment substituted the legal 
standard for Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in place of the Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard, but it is otherwise almost verbatim with the Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion To Dismiss. 
On July 19, 2002, the Pentad defendants filed a Reply Memorandum In 
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment and an Affidavit from Mr. Goodman himself. 
The Reply Memorandum, a nineteen-page document, again contains some excellent 
research and effective argument, but again most of it is based upon a third pass at the 
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basic legal authorities already cited. The Goodman Affidavit is thorough, but the seven-
page document is based principally on Mr. Goodman's review of plaintiffs' allegations 
rather than on special investigation and unique drafting effort of Goodman and Pentad's 
counsel. 
Plaintiffs recognize that Goodman and Pentad's counsel had to prepare for 
hearing on August 19th, prepare a proposed Order, and respond to the plaintiffs' Objection 
to the Order. Finally, of course, Goodman and Pentad's counsel had to prepare the 
Motion For Award Of Attorney Fees, a five-page pleading, and a supporting Affidavit, a 
document with three pages of text. 
The proposition urged on the Court by Goodman and Pentad is that this 
effort is worth $27,699.56. It is not. With regard to the reasonableness of attorney fees, 
"what an attorney bills or the number of hours spent on a case is not determinative" of 
what is reasonable and appropriate. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d at 990; see 
also Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Furthermore, "the trial judge [is] not necessarily compelled to accept such self-
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interested testimony whole cloth and make such an award." Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 
578 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1978). 
Another problem with the reasonableness of Goodman and Pentad's 
requested attorney fees is that, from the billing statements, they appear to pertain in 
several regards to communications and coordination with Pentad's professional insurer 
through its adjuster, Samye Hoss. Time spent administering a collateral contractual issue 
for Pentad (and presumably for Goodman, Pentad's employee) should not be charged to 
the plaintiffs. 
All of the foregoing concerns are complicated by the failure to allocate the 
specific effort between causes of action which are covered by the contractual attorney fee 
clause and those which are not. The decision of Goodman and Pentad to focus on oral 
modification of the written contract-the primary point of the claims directed solely at the 
sellers-as the lynch pin of the claims against themselves, was effective but it did not 
thereby qualify Goodman and Pentad to participate as "parties" for all of the rights and 
interests under the REPC. All in all, the trial court was left with an insufficient 
39 
evidentiary basis upon which to decide the appropriate amount of legal expenses, even if 
Goodman and Pentad had a contractual right to obtain their recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs request this court reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment on each claim asserted against Goodman and Pentad. A 
determination that summary judgment was not proper would necessarily require a reversal 
of the award of attorney fees. Also, the court should remand this matter in order to allow 
the parties to conduct discovery. In the event this court finds the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment was proper, this court should still reverse the trial court's award of 
attorney fees as neither Goodman nor Pentad were parties to the REPC which provide the 
sole basis for the award. Assuming, the Goodman and Pentad were entitled to attorney 
fees, this court should remand the award to comply with Utah law and for entry of a 
reasonable award consistent with these principles. 
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DATED this ? g day of July, 2003. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
%nt£ I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Certificate was delivered via U.S. Mail on this 3 0 day of July, 2003, to the following: 
Jeffrey W. Shields, Esq. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & 
INGERSOLL 
201 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
fx: 531-3001 
KP^M*^ W/( iU, 
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ADDENDUM 
COMMERCIAL-: NlDUSTRIAL-iNVESTMENT 
F L ESTATE PURCHASE CONTR> 
This is a iega'ly binding contract. Parties to this contract may agree, in writing, to alter or delete provisions of this contract. 
Seek advise from your attorney or tax advisor before entering into a binding contract. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
The Buyer, C. Kurt Hoffman and John A. Fericks, or their assigns , offers to purchase the Property described below 
and delivers as Earnest Money Deposit $5,000.00** in the form of a check to: 
E the Brokerage, to be deposited within three business days after Acceptance of this Offer to Purchase by all parties. 
a the Title/Escrow Company identified below. 
Brokerage or Title/Escrow Company: Pentad Properties, Inc. 
Address: 349 S. 200 E. Suite 330 
Received By: Date: 
Phone Number: 801-350-0100 
(If Title/Escrow Company) for deposit no later than: Date: 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: See attached Exhibit "A" 
Address: Approximately 1150 W. South Jordan Parkway, South Jordan, Utah 
City, County & State: South Jordan, Salt Lake, Utah 
For legal description, see nattached Addendum # ; ta preliminary title report, when available, as provided below. 
1.1 INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures presently attached to the 
Property. The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale 
with warranties as to title: N/A
 M m 
1.2 EXCLUDED ITEMS. These items are excluded from this sale: N/A 
2. PURCHASE PRICE & FINANCING: The Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows: 
$5,000.00** Earnest Money Deposit 
S Loan Proceeds: 
a Representing the liability to be assumed by Buyer under an existing assumable loan (a with a 
without Seller being released of liability) in this approximate amount with a Buyer a Seller agreeing 
to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees. Any net differences between the approximate 
balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance at Closing shall then be adjusted in 
a Cash a Other: . 
a From new institutional financing on terms no less favorable to the Buyer than the following: 
Interest Rate for first period prior to adjustment, if any. 
Amortization Period 
Term 
Other than these, the loan terms shall be the best obtainable under the loan for which the Buyer 
applies below. 
• From Seller-held financing, as described in the attached Seller Financing Addendum. 
$10,000.00** Other: Additional earnest money due April 6, 2002 
$298,000.00 Balance of Purchase Price in cash at closing. 
$313t000.00 TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
3. CLOSING: This transaction shall be closed on or before February 15, 2003 . Closing shall occur when: (a) 
Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), all documents required by this 
Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instruction signed by the Buyer and Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the 
moneys required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the escrow/title company in the form of 
collected or cleared funds; and (c) the deed which the Seller has agreed to deliver under Section 6 has been recorded. 
Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half of the escrow Closing fee, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing. 
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EXHIBIT A 
"axes and assessments for the curr vear. rents and Interest on assumed oc!ir ns shai! be prorated as set forth :n 
this Section. All deposits on tenancy, ^hall be transferred to Buyer at Closing, h , ations set forth in this Section shall 
be made as of a date of Closing; a date of possession; o other . 
4. POSSESSION: Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within 12 hours after Closing. 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this Contract, the Listing Agent, Joe Goodman, 
Pentad Properties, Inc. , represents B Seller D Buyer and the Selling Agent, -Gieg 3liieIdSrP8fttod Propcrtico.-tne-, 
represents D Seller a Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Contract, written disclosure of the agency ^ i - ~ 
relationship was provided to him/her. ( ) Buyer's Initials ( ) Seller's Initials. Pentad Propertiesjnc. to receive 6% \ 
commission out of the sale proceeds at closing. c »-Mn£-l & fapn* I Vfv ^x ^C/ & 
6. TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE: (a) Seller has, or shall have at Closing, free title to the 
Property and agrees to convey such to Buyer by H general D special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as 
warranted under Section 10.6] (b) Seller agrees to pay for and furnish Buyer at Closing, with a current standard form 
Owner's policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy shall conform with Seller's 
obligations under subsections (a) and(b). Unless otherwise agreed under Section 8.4, the commitment shall conform with 
the title insurance commitment provided under Section 7.1. 
a The Buyer elects to obtain a full-coverage extended ALTA policy of title insurance under 6(b). The cost of this 
coverage, above that of a standard Owner's policy, shall be paid for by the a Buyer a Seller. Also, the cost of a full-
coverage ALTA survey shall be paid for by the a Buyer a Seller. 
7. SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER: 
7.1 SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Seller will deliver to the Buyer the following Seller Disclosures no later than 
the number of calendar days indicated below which shall be days after Acceptance: 
(days) 
a (a) a Seller Property Condition Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller: 
a (b) a commitment of the policy to title insurance required under Section 6, to be issued 
by the title insurance company chosen by Seller, including copies of all documents listed 
as Exceptions on the Commitment: 45 
a (c) a copy of all loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber 
the Property after Closing: 10 
a (d) a copy of all leases and rental agreements now in effect with regard to the Property 
together with a current rent roll: 10 
a (e) operating statements of the Property for its last full fiscal years of operation 
plus the current fiscal year through , certified by the Seller or by an 
independent auditor: 
D (f) tenant Estoppel agreements: 
Seller agrees to pay any charge for cancellation of the title commitment provided under subsection (b). 
If Seller does not provide any of the Seller Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, the Buyer may 
either waive the particular Seller Disclosure requirement by taking no timely action, or the Buyer may notify the Seller, 
in writing, within 10 calendar days after the expiration of the particular disclosure time period that the Seller is in 
Default under this Contract and the remedies under Section 16 are at the Buyer's disposal. The holder of the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to the Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit 
without the requirement of further written authorization from the Seller. 
7.2 BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. The Buyer agrees to: 
a (a) Apply for approval of the assumption or funding of the loan proceeds described in Section 2 by completing, 
signing, and delivering to the Lender the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and 
by paying all fees as required by the Lender (including appraisal fee) no later than calendar days after 
Acceptance; and 
a (b) No later than calendar days after Acceptance, obtain from the Lender to whom application is made 
under subsection (a) a written commitment to approve the assumption of the existing loan or to fund the new loan 
subject only to changes of conditions in Buyer's credit worthiness and to normal loan closing procedures; or, if 
Buyer elects, providing Seller with absolute assurance, within the same time frame, that the proceeds required 
for funding the Total Purchase Price are available. 
These Buyer Undertakings are at the sole expense of the Buyer and are material elements of this Contract for the 
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benefit o* both the Buyer and the Se 
If Buyer does not initiate any . -/er Undertaking and provide Seller with v .en confirmation in the time agreed 
above, the Seller may either waive the particular Buyer Undertaking requirement by taking no timely action of the Seller 
may notify the Buyer in wntmg within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the particular undertaking time period that 
the Buyer is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at the Seller's disposal The 
holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Sellers written notice, deliver to the Se'ler the 
Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of further written authorization from the Buyer 
7.3 ADDITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE. The Buyer shall undertake the following Additional Due Diligence 
elements at its own expense and for its own benefit for the purpose of complying with the Contingencies under Section 
8 
a (a) Ordering and obtaining an appraisal of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 7 2, 
a (b) Ordering and obtaining a survey of the Property if one is not otheiv/ise required under Section 6 
a (c) Ordering and obtaining any environmentally related study of the Property, 
a (d) Ordering and obtaining a physical inspection report regarding and completing a personal inspection of the 
Property, 
a (e) Requesting and obtaining verification that the Property complies with all applicable federal, state and local 
laws, ordinance and regulations with regard to zoning and permissible use of the Property 
Seller agrees to cooperate fully with Buyer's completing these Due Diligence matters and to make the Property available 
as reasonable and necessary for the same 
8. CONTINGENCIES: This offer is subject to the Buyer's approving, in its sole discretion, the Seller Disclosures, 
the Buyer Undertakings and Additional Due Diligence matters in Section 7 However, the Buyer's discretion in 
approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7 2 (b) is subject to Buyer's covenant with regard to minimally 
acceptable financing terms under Section 2 
8 1 Buyer shall have 55 calendar days after the times specified in Sections 7 1 and 7 2 for receipt of Seller 
Disclosures and for completion of Buyer Undertakings to review the content of the disclosures and the outcome of the 
undertakings The latest applicable date under Sections 7 1 and 7 2 applies for completing a review of the content of 
Additional Due Diligence matters under Section 7 3 
8 2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure, Buyer Undertaking, or 
Due Diligence matter within the time provided in Section 8 1% that item will be deemed approved by Buyer 
8 3 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have 5 calendar days after receipt of the objections to resolve 
Buyer's objections Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's objections Likewise, the Buyer is under no 
obligation to accept any resolution proposed by the Seller If Buyer's objections are not resolved within the stated time, 
Buyer may void this Contract by providing written notice to Seller within the same stated time The holder of the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit 
without the requirement of any further written authorization from Seller If this Contract is not voided by Buyer, Buyer's 
objection is deemed to have been waived However, this waiver does not affect warranties under Section 10 
8 4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8 3 shall be in writing and shall become part of this Contract 
9. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES: This offer is made subject to the terms of attached Addendum #ONE 
10. SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES: Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the 
following 
10 1 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the 
Property in working order and in compliance with governmental regulations, 
10 2 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property, 
10 3 At Closing, Seller will bnng current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed 
in writing by Buyer and will discharge all such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed, 
10 4 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or zoning code 
violation regarding the Property which has not been resolved 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS: After all contingencies have been removed and 
before Closing, the Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine whether or not items 
warranted by Seller in Sections 10 1, 10 2, 10 3, and 10 4 are in the warranted condition and to verify that items included 
in Section 1 1 are presently on the Property If any item is not in the warranted condition, Seller will correct repair or 
replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and (if required) Lender, escrow an amount at Closing to provide 
for such repair or replacement The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection or to claim during the "walk-
through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced in Section 1 1 or is not in the condition 
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warranted m Section to, shall constit i waiver of Buyers nghts under Section ' -nd of the warranties contained in 
Section 10. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION: Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no 
new leases entered into and no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be undertaken without the 
written consent of the Buyer. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS: If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the 
person signing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs 
or successors in interest to Buyer or Seller. If the Seller is not the vested Owner of the Property but has control over the 
vested Owner's disposition of the Property, the Seller agrees to exercise this control and deliver title under this Contract 
as if it had been signed by the vested Owner. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT: This instrument (together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller 
Disclosures) constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties. 
This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not 
limited to the disposition of the Earnest Money Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be 
submitted to mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. Any Agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the 
mediation shall be binding. If mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall 
apply. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing a 
complaint with the court, serving the Seller by means of summons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis 
pendens with regard to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering the complaint 
pending mediation. Also, the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation. 
16. DEFAULT: If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages 
or return the Earnest Money Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to the return 
of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the 
Earnest Money Deposit or sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the liquidated 
damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides 
a specific remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be 
available under common law. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES: In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
18. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY: The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized 
by: (a) Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 8.3; (b) separate written agreement of the parties, including an agreement under Section 15 
if (a) does not apply; or (c) court order. 
19. ABROGATION: Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not 
apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS: All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE: Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extensions 
must be agreed to in writing by both parties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date 
shall be required absolutely by 5:00 P.M., Mountain Time on the stated date. 
22. COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS: This Contract may be signed in counterparts, and 
each counterpart bearing an original signature shall be considered one document with all others bearing original signature. 
Also, facsimile transmission of any signed original document and re-transmission of any signed facsimile transmission 
shall be the same as delivery of an original. 
23. ACCEPTANCE: Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other; 
(a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the 
other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
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24. OFFER AND TIME FOR P --PTANCE: Buyer offers to purchase tr r operty on the aoove tenns ana 
conditions If Seller does not accept o,.~r by 5 00 • AM a PM Mountain Time, ^bruan/6 , 2002, this offer shall 
lapse, and the holder of the Earnest Money Deposit shall return it to the Buyer. 
(Buyer's Signature) (Offer Reference Date) 
Buyer's Name (please pnnt) 
(Notice Address) (Phone Number) 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
• Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
</di/** &tA*tf* > A / ^ (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
Seller's Name (please print) 
(Notice Address) (Phone Number) 
n Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Seller's Initials) (Date) (Time) 
• Counter Offer: Seller present for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in attached Counter Offer # . 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures (One of the following 
alternatives must therefore be completed) 
A - I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURES OF BUYER 
Date Date 
Date Date 
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing contract bearing all signatures to be mailed on 
_, 2002 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the a Seller a Buyer, Sent by 
Seller's Initials ( ) Date Buyer's Initials ( ) Date 
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ADDENDUM # ONE 
TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is an ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an Offer Reference Date of 
February 1 . 2002 including all addenda and counter offers, between C. Kurt Hoffman and John A. Fericks, or their 
assigns . as Buyer(s) and Lucy Ann Soffe Trust as Seller(s). The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the 
REPC, and to the extent those terms modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, these shall control. All other 
terms of the REPC not modified shall remain the same. 
1. Earnest Money: 
Final Purchase Price: 
Buyer shall deposit with Seller an additional $10,000 of non-refundable 
earnest money on or before April 6, 2002. If Buyer fails to deliver said 
earnest money to Seller by April 6, 2002 Seller may void this contract at its 
option. Buyer shall have until April 6, 2002 to conduct its due diligence and 
to complete a feasibility study of the site. If Seller has not received written 
notice from Buyer of Buyer's desire to void the contract prior to April 6, 2002, 
then the original $5000.00 earnest money shall become non-refundable. 
The final purchase price shall be based on a rate of $6.20 per square foot as 
determined by a survey of the property. If, however, Buyer chooses to close 
on the property prior to August 1, 2002, then the purchase price shall be 
based on a rate of $6.00 per square foot. 
D Seller a Buyer shall have until a A.M. a P.M. Mountain Time, _, 2002, to accept 
these terms in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC. 
:? ^'Z~ 
D Buyer^SellerSignatu Date 
n Buyer a Seller Signature Date 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTEROFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
-•cf Acceptance: a Seller a Buyer hereby accept these terms 
a Buyer a Seller Signature Date Time 
a Buyer a Seller Signature Date Time 
a Rejection: n Seller a Buyer rejects these terms 
(Initials) (Date) (Time) 
a Counter Offer: D Seller a Buyer presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter Offer #_ 
Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse. 
C:\MyFiles\REPC\s.jordan hoffman.wpd 
ADO* MOO* Z3~. 
S o u r - Jw*o»*. C * * « N — . " 
<s 
52 
27-14 32 
c/i 
oi 
in a 
COLJ 
SCALE: I" • 100" 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
C KURT HOFFMAN Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOE GOODMAN Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW & MOTION 
Case No: 020903870 MI 
Judge: J DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: August 19, 2002 
Clerk: cindyb 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RUSSELL C. FERICKS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DALE E. ANDERSON 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:22-10:17 
HEARING 
Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion to Dismiss 
is argued to the Court by respective counsel and granted for the 
reasons stated on the record. Attorney Shields to prepare the 
appropriate order. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN FERICKS, et al, : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 020903870 MI 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST, et al( Date: September 27, 2002 
Defendant(s), : 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit for Decision (Defendants' Motion for Protective Order) 
filed September 24, 2002 and Notice to Submit for Decision 
(Plaintiffs' Objection to Proposed Order on Motion for Summary 
Judgment) filed September 24, 2002, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Moving Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is granted 
for the reasons specified in the supporting memorandum. 
2. Plaintiffs' Objection to the Proposed Order on Summary 
Judgment is denied for the reasons stated in the opposing 
memoranda. The Summary Judgment Order accurately reflects this 
Court's ruling and is executed September 27, 2002. 
Case No. 020903870 MI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 30th day of September, 2002, I sent by 
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
Jeffrey Weston Shields 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 600 - One Utah Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Dale E. Anderson 
635 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Russell C. Fericks 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, 7th floor 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
e^  b 
District Court Deputy 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, ESQ. (USB #2948) 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc and 
Joe Goodman 
One Utah Center - Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
DEFENDANTS PENTAD, 
GOODMAN AND THE SOFFE, 
DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 020903870 
Judge Frederick 
Defendants. 
The Motions of Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman (collectively 
"Pentad Defendants") to Dismiss or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment ("Motion for 
Summary Judgment"), and the joinder in the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants 
Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, Carlos Soffe, Von Soffe and Shirla Holt as trustees (collectively "Soffe 
F
'
l
« »«TIUCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 3 9 2002 
SALT
 MKE^OUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
JOHN FERICKS; and KURT HOFFMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST; CHARLES R. 
SOFFE, AS Trustee of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust 
and individually; PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC; 
JOE GOODMAN individually, and JOHN DOE 
BUYER, 
UT_DOCS_A #1113941 v1 
Defendants") came duly before the Court for hearing, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
District Court Judge, presiding, on August 19, 2002 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. Pentad Defendants 
were represented by their counsel of record, Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. of and for Ballard 
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP. The Soffe Defendants were represented by their counsel of 
record, Dale E. Andersen, Esq. of Spencer & Andersen. The Plaintiffs were represented by their 
counsel of record, Russell S. Fericks, Esq. of Richards. Brandt, Miller and Nelson, P.C. The 
Court, having heard arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and 
other submissions of the parties, and having rendered its ruling from the bench at the conclusion 
of the hearing, and being duly advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, 
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Pentad Defendants is GRANTED. 
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Soffe Defendants, by joinder, is 
GRANTED. 
3. Based upon the foregoing rulings, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each 
and every cause of action thereof, is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
4. Application for award of attorneys' fees and costs shall be submitted by separate 
application in accordance with Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-505. 
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5. The Lis Pendens recorded on the title to the property subject of this action by 
Plaintiff shall be immediately removed of record. 
DATED this j [ | day o f^dfe t r 2002 
BYTH 
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^s^\t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the slay of August, z<J02, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS PENTAD, GOODMAN AND THE SOFFE, 
DEFENDANTS, AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT upon the 
following addressees by first-class mail, postage prepaid: 
Russell C. Fericks 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Dale E. Anderson, Esq. 
Spencer & Anderson 
635-18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN FERICKS, et al, : MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s), : CASE NO. 020903870 MI 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST, et al, : Date: November 26, 2002 
Defendant(s), 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit for Decision (Motion of Pentad Defendants for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs) filed November 22, 2002, the Court rules 
as follows: 
1. Moving defendants' Motion for Award of Fees, etc. is 
granted for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda 
excepting point V of the Reply Memorandum. 
2. This Court is persuaded the fees requests are reasonable 
and necessary for the successful pursuit of the moving defendants' 
claims. 
3. Counsel for movants to prepare the order and judgment. 
Case No. 020903870 MI 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 26th day of November, 2002, I sent by 
first class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document 
to the following: 
Jeffrey Weston Shields Dale E. Anderson 
201 South Main Street 635 - 18:n Avenue 
Suite 600, One Utah Center Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Russell C. Fericks 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
District Cou 
IM^ED ^-ggagr 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, ESQ. (USB #2948) 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc. and 
Joe Goodman 
One Utah Center - Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
f J 2002 
SALT UKE COUNTY 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS J M7! 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN FERICKS; and KURT HOFFMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LUCY ANN SOFFE TRUST; CHARLES R. 
SOFFE, as Trustee of the Lucy Ann Soffe Trust 
and individually; PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC; 
JOE GOODMAN individually, and JOHN DOE 
BUYER. 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER ON 
MOTION OF PENTAD 
PROPERTIES, INC. AND JOE 
GOODMAN FOR AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
and 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC. AND 
JOE GOODMAN FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. 020903870 
Judge Frederick 
The Motion of Defendants Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs came before the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, for 
decision without hearing pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(l)(D). 
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The Court reviewed the respective memoranda and affidavits of the parties and rendered its 
Minute Entry Ruling on November 26, 2002. Based thereupon, the Court 
ENTERS ITS FINDINGS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman are "prevailing parties" against the 
Plaintiffs in this action having prevailed on all issues and causes of action by summary judgment. 
2. The Real Estate Purchase Contract subject of this action provides for award of 
attorneys fees and costs as a matter of contract. 
3. Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman are entitled to an award of attorneys 
fees and costs under the Real Estate Purchase Contract by virtue of the allegations of the 
Amended Complaint alleging that Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman were the agents of 
Soffe, one of the principal parties to the Real Estate Purchase Contract. Pentad Properties, Inc. 
and Joe Goodman were not the agents of Plaintiffs and were not required to have a separate 
written agreement with Plaintiffs to recover their attorneys fees in this action. 
4. The legal work on behalf of Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman shown in 
the Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Shields was actually performed. 
5. All of the legal work performed on behalf of Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe 
Goodman as shown in the Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Shields was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute their case. 
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6. The attorney's billing rates shown in the Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Shields are 
consistent with rates customarily charged in this locality for similar services. 
7. There are no additional circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
8. Paralegal fees billed by Defendants' law firms may be awarded as attorney's fees 
in Utah and are awarded. 
9. Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman may have all of their attorney's fees 
awarded without allocation because the entire case was resolved in their favor with a common 
defense such that all fees are necessarily allocated to the result. 
10. Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman are the real and necessary parties in 
interest with respect to the application for award of attorneys fees despite the fact that counsel 
was engaged by an insurer and Pentad Properties, Inc.'s and Joe Goodman's counsel is 
authorized to pursue reimbursement of attorney's fees on the insurer's behalf. 
12. Plaintiffs did not bring this action in bad faith, and Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe 
Goodman do not, consequently, allege sufficient grounds for an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Section 78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 
PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC. AND JOE GOODMAN AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS JOHN 
FERICKS AND KURT HOFFMAN, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, AS FOLLOWS: 
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1. For the principal sum of Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Nine 
Dollars and 52/100 cents ($27,699.52); 
2. For interest on this sum from date of entry of this judgment until paid at the 
maximum statutory post-judgment interest rate; 
3. Additional attorney's fees claimed by Pentad Properties, Inc. and Joe Goodman, if 
any, incurred in further proceedings in this action shall be requested in accordance with Rule 4-
505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
DATED AND ENTERED this llVjday of December, 2002. 
BY Ttffi COUR' 
f 
J. DENNI; 
DISTRICT JUDGBI 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the '.-IcJL day of December, 2002, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER ON MOTION OF PENTAD 
PROPERTIES, INC. AND JOE GOODMAN FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND COSTS AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PENTAD PROPERTIES, INC. AND 
JOE GOODMAN FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AGAINST 
PLANTIFFS upon the following addressees by first-class mail, postage prepaid: 
Russell C. Fericks 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Dale E. Anderson, Esq. 
Spencer & Anderson 
635- 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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